

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 7, 1977

Kile One

MEMORANDUM

TO

ARA - Mr. William Luers ARA - Mr. Frank Devine ARA -- Mr. Stephen Rogers USOAS - Mr. Robert White LD/HA - Mr. Mark Schneider S/P - Mr R. Feinberg ARA/AND - Mr. M.R. Barnebey

ARA/ECA - Mr. Robert Zimmermann

FROM:

ARA/PPC - Luigi Einaudi

SUBJECT: Guidance on Southern Cone Bloc Initiatives

Siven the urgency of putting this out now, we will assume we have your clearance unless you provide comments (hopefully with alternate language) to Art Woodruff, ARA/PPC, x29193, before 3:30 p.m. today.

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DRAFT CABLE

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TO: AMREP Precedence: PRIORITY

E.O. 11652:XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, SHUM, PA, AR, CO, BR, VE, BL, PE, EC, CI
SUBJECT: Guidance on Southern Cone initiatives bloc
REFERENCE: Asuncion 2279

- 1. Reftel reports that the prospective June 3 meeting of Southern Cone Chiefs of State has appearedly been postponed and downgraded to a pre-OASGA meeting in Grenada among Foreign Ministers. This cable provides general guidance on our response to this and similar efforts our policies on the policies of the policies o
- 2. While the disruptive potential of a geo-political and ideological bloc centered on the Southern Cone is clear, the difficulties encountered by the promoters of a Chiefs of State meeting suggest that practical feasibility of such a bloc is still limited. Unless some catalytic event intervenes, therefore, we suspect that if some Southern Cone Foreign Ministers do eventually meet in Grenada, they are likely to do little more than attempt to coordinate privately their views and positions prior to the OASGA.
- 3. As there is ample precedent for Latin American caucuses prior to international meetings, a Southern Cone mini-caucus in Grenada does not in itself warrant alarm. Nor for that

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matter, is it something we could at this point do much to prevent.

- The longer-run implications of a regional or subregional coalition against our human rights policies is considerably more serious, however. Clearly, it would serve only Pinochet's interests to inveigle other countries into identification with Chile. Conversely, our relations with Argentina or Brazil and, for that matter, even the South American democracies could only be damaged by the emergence of such a bloc or their association with it. In addition, we have received assurances from the government of Paraguay that it would invite the IAHRC to visit Paraguay this year. Were this decision to be changed now under what could only appear to be pressures from an international coalition of military hardliners, the result would be very damaging to the inter-American system as well as to prospects for multilateralizing the promotion of internationally recognized human rights.
- 5. Our responses to feelers on these matters must keep several considerations in mind. We do not want to overreact in ways that would fuel fears of US intervention, provide ammunition to hardliners, embarras our friends, or otherwise provoke a new wave of Latin American "solidarity" against us. Of equal importance, we do not want to take such a soft line that we appear defensive, confused, or prepared to yield to extreme nationalist reactions.

In particular, it is essential that we not appear disposed to retreat on human rights.

- 6. Action Requested. We should not now appear overly interested or overly concerned about the possibility of a preOASGA mini-caucus. If asked about other more formal initiatives tending toward bloc formation, however, you should respond that, while we obviously cannot object to meetings among other governments, we just as obviously have reservations about any moves antagonistic to the effective promotion of human rights. We expect to be able to work constructively, both bilaterally and in the OAS and elsewhere, to develop policies that will be supported by the nations of this hemisphere. We see no value in not discussing these issues openly.
- 7. While the above should be communicated in response to all inquiries, some additional tailoring to specific situations is also desirable. When an inquiry comes from a government that has turned down Southern Cone approaches, you should state frankly that we are pleased that they are not joining what appear to be ill-conceived efforts to form an organized front against our common efforts. When an inquiry comes from a government that is undecided or from an official who is sufficiently open to understand the point, you should note that the emergence of bloc politics can only serve to polarize

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relations and make adjustments to individual situations more difficult than ever.

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